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I. INTRODUCTION
After keeping faith-based organizations in exile for many years, the
government is now taking steps to welcome them into the land of government-
funded programs. But even though the border may be open, faith-based organi-
zations are still likely to encounter trouble within. One primary source of trou-
ble arises in government programs that prohibit organizations from engaging in
certain types of religious expressive activities with government funds. Such
restrictions take a variety of statutory and regulatory forms. For instance, the
so-called "charitable choice" provisions, which have been applied to a range of
grant programs in recent years, prohibit any government funds from being ex-
pended for "sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization."' Restrictive pro-
42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-65(i) (West Supp. 2002) (Substance Abuse And Mental Health Ser-
vices Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9920(c) (Supp. V 1999) (Community Services Block Grants); 42 U.S.C. §
604(a)(j) (Supp. V 1999) (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families). Property acquired with
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds may not be used for "religious purposes or
[to] otherwise promote religious interests. This limitation includes the acquisition of property for
ownership by primarily religious entities." 24 C.F.R. § 570.200 (j)(l) (2002). Further, in provid-
ing services with CDBG funds, primarily religious entities must "provide no religious instruction
or counseling, conduct no religious worship or services, engage in no religious proselytizing, and
exert no other religious influence in the provision of such public services." 24 C.F.R. § 570.200
(j)(3)(iii) (2002). Grants recently made by the Department of Labor to small faith-based and
community organizations for workforce development programs were subject to the condition that
no funds could be used for "instruction in religion ... worship, prayer, proselytizing, or other
inherently religious practices." Grants for Small-Faith-Based and Community-Based Non-Profit
Organizations, 67 Fed. Reg. 32,016 (May 13, 2002); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2938(a)(3) (2000).
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visions such as these, if not properly defined, will send many faith-based or-
ganizations back into exile.
As an initial matter, religious expression restrictions in government pro-
grams are virtually impossible to apply consistently. This difficulty arises in
part from the fact that terms such as "sectarian worship, sectarian instruction,
and sectarian proselytization" have different meanings for different religious
organizations based on their particular theological views regarding the nature of
their activities. In addition, religious organizations incorporate religious content
into their activities in a variety of ways.
Administrative agencies and the courts may resolve this ambiguity
through administrative guidance and case law, but when they look to the United
States Supreme Court for guidance, they will discover that the Court appears to
have backed itself into a corner. On the one hand, the Court has ruled that pri-
vate recipients of government funds have free speech rights. Further, when con-
strued broadly, religious expression restrictions constitute viewpoint discrimina-
tion and improperly single out religion for adverse treatment. On the other
hand, the Court has held that the Establishment Clause prohibits direct govern-
ment funding of at least certain types of private religious expression in certain
contexts.
There is, fortunately, a way out. A close reading of the Court's Estab-
lishment Clause cases reveals that the Court has, in fact, never required a broad
construction of religious expression restrictions in religiously neutral govern-
ment aid programs. Therefore, interpretive guidance based on a narrow con-
struction, one that only applies to religious expression outside the scope of a
government program, minimizes the risk of a constitutional violation.2 Indeed, a
narrow construction reflects the fundamental principles underlying the Religion
Clauses: neutrality with respect to religion and respect for the religious expres-
sion that constitutes an essential component of the identity of many individuals
and faith-based organizations. Government policy based on these principles
will fulfill the welcome promised to faith-based providers.
Part II of this article discusses the difficulties that arise in attempting to
define and apply the religious expression restrictions. This part identifies two
possible constructions of the restriction language, one narrow and one broad,
that address the key difficulties. Parts III and IV examine how these construc-
Similarly, the facilities grant program upheld in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), ex-
cluded any facility that was to be used for "sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship
.... " Id. at 675 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 751(a)(2) (1964 & Supp. V) (repealed 1972)). A more
general grant program upheld in Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, 466 U.S. 736,
740-41 (1976), prohibited grantees from using any grant moneys for "sectarian purposes." The
school aid program upheld in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 849 (2000), prohibited any aid
from being used for "religious worship or instruction."
2 The United States Supreme Court has stated that "when there are two reasonable construc-
tions for a statute, yet one raises a constitutional question, the Court should prefer the interpreta-
tion which avoids the constitutional issue." Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545
(2001). The same principle applies to the administration of a statutory program.
2003]
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tions implicate First Amendment principles of free speech, free exercise, and
nonestablishment. Part V and the Appendix identify several additional imple-
mentation considerations related to restrictions on private religious expression
and present sample regulations applying a narrow construction of such restric-
tions.
II. DEFINITIONAL AMBIGUITY AND INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ALTERNATIVES
A. Interpretation Difficulties
A number of ambiguities arise when seeking to interpret and apply the
religious expression restrictions to the various types of religious expressive ac-
tivities. These ambiguities can be grouped into the following categories.
1. Religious Perspectives and Approaches
Several government funded activities challenged in a recent case help il-
lustrate the issues related to religious perspectives on government program ob-
jectives. The case, American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana v. Foster,3 in-
volved the use by private organizations of funds distributed by the state under a
federal program that allocates funds for teaching and promoting sexual absti-
nence among youth. The challenged activities included: (1) a chastity program
entitled "God's Gift of Life;" (2) radio programs teaching on abstinence in rela-
tion to the Virgin Birth and God's plan for sexual purity; (3) skits that promote
abstinence based on the life and teaching of Jesus; (4) a religious youth revival
challenging attendees to make a religious commitment and to abstain from sex
based on teachings in the Bible; (5) the purchase of Bibles and other religious
materials as resources for an abstinence program; and (6) prayer sessions at
abortion clinics and pro-life rallies.4
All of the challenged activities undoubtedly include religious content.
However, in varying degrees, each of the activities also advances the govern-
ment's objective of teaching or promoting abstinence. The question for faith-
based organizations and government officials, then, is whether in each case the
activity constitutes impermissible sectarian instruction or permissible instruction
on abstinence from a religious viewpoint.
More generally, it may be assumed that "sectarian instruction" encom-
passes instruction on religious doctrine solely for the purpose of advancing a
particular religious sect. But an organization may also engage in instruction on
a government program topic from a religious perspective or with some religious
content (e.g., teaching on self-esteem rooted in God's love as a key to overcom-
ing the temptation to engage in sexual conduct for social approval). Further, the
3 No. 02-1440, 2002 WL 1733651 (E.D. La. July 24, 2002).
4 Id. at *3-*6.
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content may be very generic (e.g., "God is love and we all share in that ove"),
or it may be very specific (e.g., "God's love is demonstrated through the death
and resurrection of Jesus").
Similarly, the term "sectarian worship" might clearly apply to a weekly
worship service. It is unclear, however, whether the term also encompasses
religious activities such as prayer conducted in furtherance of government pro-
gram objectives (and whether it makes a difference if the prayer is generic or
specific, or whether it is clearly prayer and not merely meditation). For in-
stance, a counselor might pray with an individual for strength to overcome
temptations and peer pressure to engage in sexual activity. The extent to which
such instruction or worship should properly be considered sectarian instruction
or worship, or simply instruction and counseling from a religious viewpoint, is
not self-evident, particularly in light of the constitutional issues discussed in
Parts III and IV, infra.
2. Internal or Incidental Expression
A faith-based organization that refrains from engaging in any organized
activity with the public that includes expressly religious content may still incor-
porate religious content into its internal activities. For instance, it is easy to
imagine that the employees and volunteers of the faith-based organizations chal-
lenged in Foster engage in times of prayer (both organized and personal) for
their activities and the youth they are trying to reach. They might also study
religious teaching related to sexual abstinence (and to other aspects of life), and
may display religious messages at their workplace.
Likewise, many of an organization's activities may include an incidental
amount of uniquely religious content as part of the overall program. This con-
tent may or may not have a direct bearing on the objectives of the program. As
an example, an organization that builds houses for the poor with a combination
of paid and volunteer workers might begin each workday with a prayer. Simi-
larly, the organization may expect that its employees and volunteers will share
their faith "informally" with prospective residents in the course of their house
construction activity. And regardless of any such expectation, employees and
volunteers of faith-based organizations would generally welcome the opportu-
nity to discuss religious matters with individuals who initiate discussion of such
matters with them.
The extent to which these activities (which shall be referred to herein as
"incidentally religious activities") constitute "sectarian worship, instruction or
proselytization" is unclear. The application is complicated by the fact that both
private and government employees enjoy broad rights to bring their religious
practices into the workplace.5 It would seem odd to conclude, as a strict reading
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994) (requiring private employers to accommodate the religious
practices of their employees unless doing so creates an "undue hardship" on the employer); THE
WHITE HOUSE, GUIDELINES ON RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN THE FEDERAL
20031
5
Lark: Religious Expression, Government Funds, and the First Amendment
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2003
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
of the language might indicate, that employees of private organizations receiv-
ing government funds may engage in less religious activity than government
employees.
3. Subjective Perspective
Many religious persons engaged in instruction with no express religious
content nevertheless consider the instruction to be religious in nature on the doc-
trinal premise that all knowledge comes from God. For such persons, it simply
makes no sense to distinguish between teaching on sexual abstinence (which
that person believes to be a part of the design of God for humans created to re-
flect his character), and teaching on the character of God (e.g., on God's purity
and holiness). Persons holding such religious views might conclude that all of
their activities constitute "sectarian instruction," particularly if they could be
held liable for an interpretation with which a judge subsequently disagrees.
Similarly, a religious organization may, as a matter of doctrine, hold
that all of its activities constitute "worship." For example, some faiths teach
that serving the poor is a way of serving God, which is, in turn, an act of wor-
ship. On this basis, religious organizations may rightly assert in other legal con-
texts that their activities constitute religious worship. For instance, property tax
exemptions in some states turn on whether the subject property is being used
exclusively for religious worship (or religious "purposes"). 6 From this perspec-
tive, an organization's representation that its activities do not constitute religious
worship for charitable choice purposes may appear inconsistent with the posi-
tion the organization has taken for property tax exemption purposes.7
WORKPLACE (1997), available at http://oeeo.psc.gov/oeeo/12rl.html [hereinafter WORKPLACE
GUIDELINES] (acknowledging that federal employees may engage in religious expression in many
work situations).
6 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-3-106 (2002).
7 The inconsistency could be resolved by reference to whether the applicable reason for defin-
ing "religious worship" is to accommodate or restrict religious expressive activity. For instance,
in the property tax context, courts have held that reliance on the bona fide subjective perspective
of a religious organization is appropriate. See Maurer v. Young Life, 779 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1989).
In other words, religious organizations may qualify for property tax exemptions in part based on
their subjective doctrinal perspective on their activities. See East Asian Bay Local Dev. Corp. v.
State, 13 P.3d 1122 (Cal. 2000) (upholding an exemption in a state landmarking law for any prop-
erty owned by a religious organization when such organization asserts that a landmarking scheme
would deprive it of appropriate use of the property in furtherance of its religious mission). By
way of contrast, in the charitable choice context, where the term is used to restrict expressive
activity, an objective standard is necessary to avoid penalizing organizations for their internal
religious motivations. Indeed, many religious organizations could only represent that any of their
activities do not constitute religious worship if the term is understood from an objective perspec-
tive. However, in the absence of a clear distinction in the law as to when a subjective or an objec-
tive standard applies, such representations may appear directly contradictory both to the religious
organizations and/or to a property tax assessor or a court.
[Vol. 105
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The term "sectarian proselytization" raises some of the same issues as
sectarian worship. Some religious organizations consider all of their activities
to be part of the evangelism process. Even activities without any externally
identifiable religious content (e.g., tutoring on science classes) may constitute
"pre-evangelism" for some religious organizations (and they may portray it as
such when communicating with their constituencies). Therefore, it may be dif-
ficult for these organizations to conclude that they are not engaged in proselyti-
zation with respect to such activities.8
In this regard, some statutes and regulations prohibit any use of gov-
ernment funds for religious purposes.9 The use of the term "purpose" in this
context is particularly confusing since it fails to distinguish between objective
outcomes and underlying motivations (or broader intentions). In fact, the word
can refer both to a desired outcome and to an internal reason for engaging in an
activity. Accordingly, a religious organization may conduct an addiction recov-
ery program for two purposes: to help people overcome addiction and to serve
God's command to help people (or to establish relationships that may lead to
subsequent evangelism opportunities). Even if the addiction recovery program
contains no objective religious content, it may still be difficult for the religious
organization to conclude or represent that it is not conducting the program for
religious purposes. For the foregoing reasons, the term "purpose" should not be
used with respect to restrictions on religious expression.
4. Sectarian Versus Religious
The restricted activities of worship, instruction and proselytization are
predicated by the term "sectarian" instead of "religious," perhaps implying that
the restrictions do not apply to religious activities which are not also sectarian.
However, this distinction would almost certainly fail constitutional scrutiny.
The Court has long recognized the constitutional perils that arise when the gov-
ernment seeks to distinguish among religious expression based on its religious
quality. In Fowler v. Rhode Island,'0 the Court struck down a city ordinance
that permitted churches and similar religious bodies to conduct worship services
in its parks, but prohibited religious meetings. The Court held that the govern-
8 Just as a representation that certain activities do not constitute religious "worship" may
jeopardize a religious organization's property tax exemption, a representation that activities do not
constitute proselytization (or worship or sectarian instruction) may jeopardize a religious
organization's exemption from certain state religious nondiscrimination laws that only apply to
the religious activities of religious organizations. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.090 (2)
(Michie 1997) (providing exemption only for work connected with the carrying on of the religious
activity of a religious organization). But see Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 770 A.2d
111 (Md. 2001) (holding that religious employer exemption limited to religious activities violates
Free Exercise Clause).
9 See supra note 1.
10 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
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ment cannot distinguish between a "sermon" delivered at a "worship service"
and an "address" at a "religious meeting."" The Court stated:
[t]o call the words which one minister speaks to his congrega-
tion a sermon, immune from regulation, and the words of an-
other minister an address, subject to regulation, is merely an in-
direct way of preferring one religion over another. 12
Similarly, the Court has rejected a proposed distinction between "reli-
gious worship" and other forms of religious expression, observing that "the dis-
tinction [lacks] intelligible content," and that it is "highly doubtful that [the dis-
tinction] would lie within the judicial competence to administer.' 3 The Court
stated that
[m]erely to draw the distinction would require the [state]-and
ultimately the courts-to inquire into the significance of words
and practices to different religious faiths, and in varying cir-
cumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries would tend inevi-
tably to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden
by our cases.
14
The same can be said with respect to an inquiry into whether particular expres-
sion is "sectarian" or merely "religious."
B. Possible Constructions of the Religious Expression Restrictions
The definitional ambiguities associated with religious expression
restrictions arise in large part from the variety of ways in which faith-based or-
ganizations incorporate religious expression or significance into their activities.
The ambiguities discussed in the latter two categories above can be resolved
without significant controversy. With respect to the subjective perspectives
issue, government officials and the courts should clarify that no expression shall
be restricted based solely upon an organization's subjective characterization of
the expression. Further, the term "sectarian" should be deemed to be synony-
mous with the term "religious."
The following distinction between different types of activities contain-
ing religious expression provides a basis for resolving the remaining ambigui-
ties.
" id. at 69-70
12 Id.
13 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (1981).
14 Id. at 269-70 n.6
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1. Exclusively Religious Activities. Exclusively religious
activities consist of those activities of a religious organization
that are not primarily directed toward any particular objective
related to the government-funded program. Any benefit arising
from these activities with respect to the immediate objectives of
the government program is solely an incidental by-product of
the religious quality of the activities. A religious organization
engages in exclusively religious activities even if it is not pursu-
ing any particular government program objectives. For in-
stance, a church worship service would constitute an exclu-
sively religious activity. Certain individuals might find strength
to overcome addiction by attending a church worship service,
but such services are generally not directed toward this particu-
lar objective.
2. Integrated Religious Activities. These activities are directed
toward identifiable objectives of a government-funded program
and include uniquely religious content as a means of accom-
plishing these objectives. For instance, the chastity program,
radio program and skit challenged in Foster would probably
constitute integrated activities since, on the information pro-
vided, they appear to be directed primarily toward advancing
the government's objectives. 15 Similarly, the use of prayer in
an addiction counseling program to promote discipline or over-
come emotional barriers would constitute an integrated activ-
ity. 16
Based on this distinction, two possible constructions of the charitable
choice religious expression restrictions (and similar restrictions), one narrow
and one broad, help resolve the remaining definitional ambiguities discussed
above. The narrow construction would prohibit only those exclusively religious
15 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
16 The religious content in integrated activities may be divided into that which is "merely
informative" and that which is directed toward spiritual development. It has been argued that
religious expression restrictions may permit the former type, but should always prohibit the latter
type. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Consti-
tutional Order, 47 ViLE. L. REv. 37, 87 (2002) (arguing that religious organizations should not be
permitted to use government funds for activities that involve "religious transformation," even if
such transformation accomplishes the program objectives). Such a result would disqualify many
faith-based organizations because their integrated activities include expression directed toward
spiritual development. More importantly, this article argues that prohibiting private expression
based solely on its religious quality raises serious free speech and free exercise issues and is not
required by the Establishment Clause. Because the distinction does not resolve the key First
Amendment issues discussed in this article, the term "integrated activities" includes religious
expression directed toward spiritual development.
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activities that are outside the scope of the government program.17 The broad
construction would prohibit not only all exclusively religious activities, but also
all integrated religious activities.
With respect to many government programs, virtually all exclusively re-
ligious activities (except incidentally religious activities to the extent employees
and volunteers could engage in similar nonreligious activities) would be outside
the scope of the program. In the Foster case, it is possible that additional facts
would demonstrate that the youth revival meeting and religious materials are not
adequately focused on promoting abstinence and, therefore, are outside the
scope of the program. The same conclusion appears likely with respect to the
prayer meetings at abortion clinics and pro-life rallies. However, certain types
of government programs with very broad purposes might encompass at least
some exclusively religious activities. As discussed below, the premise underly-
ing a narrow construction is that religious content or viewpoints in activities that
further the objectives of a government program cannot properly be attributed to
the government as an endorsement of religion, provided that such activities are
funded without regard to their religious content.
The broad construction does not consider the extent to which religious
content might actually further the objectives of the government program. The
premise underlying this construction is that the religious content in any expres-
sion funded with direct cash payments is necessarily attributable to the govern-
ment as an endorsement of religion, even if the expression is funded without
regard to such religious content.' 8 As argued in Parts III and IV, this premise
overstates the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence and results
in substantial infringement of the free speech and free exercise rights of reli-
gious organizations.
III. BROAD RESTRICTIONS ON PRIVATE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED PROGRAMS VIOLATE THE FREE
SPEECH AND FREE EXERCISE CLAUSES
A. A Broad Construction of the Restricted Religious Expression
Constitutes Viewpoint Discrimination
In those cases where the Court has specifically examined governmental
restrictions on private religious expressive activity, it has held that such restric-
17 Accordingly, a narrow construction would permit integrated and incidentally religious ac-
tivities.
18 A strict application of this premise would also prohibit incidentally religious activities. A
moderate application might permit such activities provided the religious content is de minimis in
nature such that no cost of the program would normally be attributed to the content. But even
assuming incidentally religious activities were permitted under a broad construction, this construc-
tion would still suffer from the constitutional infirmities discussed in this article. The same result
applies with respect to the "merely informative" integrated activities discussed supra in note 16.
[Vol. 105
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tions constitute viewpoint discrimination. In Good News Club v. Milford Cen-
tral School, 19 the Court struck down a provision in an elementary school's
community use policy that prohibited use "by any individual or organization for
religious purposes., 20 The Court noted that the policy permitted use for "a vari-
ety of purposes, including events pertaining to the welfare of the community.'
Pursuant to the policy, "any group that promote[d] the moral and character de-
velopment of children [was] eligible to use the school building. 22
The controversy in Good News Club arose after some community resi-
dents applied for permission to use a school classroom after instructional hours
for a Bible club. The school argued that the activities of the club, which con-
sisted of singing religious songs, praying, memorizing Bible verses and discuss-
ing a Bible lesson and its life application, were "religious in nature" and "differ-
ent in kind" from other activities permitted by the school.2 3 Further, the school
argued that the club engaged in an "additional layer" of "quintessentially reli-
gious" activities that are "focused on teaching children how to cultivate their
relationship with God through Jesus Christ. '24 The school sought to distinguish
these activities from "pure moral and character development. 25
The Court rejected these arguments. Concluding that "the [club] seeks
to address a subject otherwise permitted under the rule, the teaching of morals
and character, from a religious standpoint," the Court held that the exclusion of
the club based on its religious nature "constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination. 26  The Court expressly disagreed with the proposition "that
something that is 'quintessentially religious' or 'decidedly religious in nature'
cannot also be characterized properly as the teaching of morals and character
development from a particular viewpoint., 27 The Court noted that there is "no
logical difference in kind between the invocation of Christianity by the Club and
the invocation of teamwork, loyalty, or patriotism by other associations to pro-
vide a foundation for their lessons. 28
19 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
20 Id. at 103 (quotation omitted).
21 Id. at 108 (quotation omitted).
22 Id. (quotation omitted).
23 Id. at 110-11.
24 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at I l1 (internal quotation omitted).
25 Id. (quotation omitted).
26 Id. at 110.
27 Id. at 111.
28 Id. The narrow construction can be implemented in a manner consistent with the Court's
observation that "quintessentially" or "decidedly" religious activities are not necessarily outside
the scope of a speech forum. In Good News Club, the applicable forum was defined in very broad
terms (e.g., "teaching of morals and character development"). However, nothing in Good News
Club indicates that in much more narrowly defined social service programs, many exclusively
20031
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Similarly, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, 29 the Court held that a policy permitting community use of school fa-
cilities for "social, civic, or recreational uses," but not for "religious purposes,"
constitutes viewpoint discrimination as applied to "a film series dealing with
family and child-rearing issues faced by parents today. '30 The Court concluded
that "it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be
used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing ex-
cept those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint.",3'
In Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia,32
the Court struck down a restriction in a public university student club funding
policy pursuant to which the university denied funding to a religious student
publication.33 The restriction excluded activities that "primarily promote[] or
manifest[] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality." 34 The
Court noted that the policy
does not exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for dis-
favored treatment those student journalistic efforts with reli-
gious editorial viewpoints. Religion may be a vast area of in-
quiry, but it also provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a
perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may
be discussed and considered. The prohibited perspective, not
the general subject matter, resulted in the refusal to make...
payments, for the subjects discussed were otherwise within the
approved category of publications.35
Finally, in Widmar v. Vincent,36 the Court held that a public university
policy that encouraged use of its facilities by student organizations but prohib-
ited any use "for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching" violated
religious activities could not properly be characterized as falling outside the scope of the program.
Similarly, this construction does not rely upon the distinction among types of religious speech
rejected by the Court in Widmar and Fowler. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text. The
narrow construction does not attempt to distinguish among types of religious activity based on
religious criteria but rather based on the extent to which the activity furthers defined government
objectives.
29 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
30 Id. at 387.
31 Id. at 393; see also id. at 393-97.
32 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
33 Id. at 845-46.
34 Id. at 825.
35 Id. at 831.
36 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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the Free Speech Clause.37 The Court held that "religious worship and discus-
sion" are "forms of speech and association protected by the First Amend-
,,38
ment.
Taken together, these cases clearly indicate that when the government
suppresses private religious expression that is otherwise within the scope of a
government program (e.g., by denying government resources for such expres-
sion), it engages in viewpoint discrimination. And this is precisely what hap-
pens when a broad construction of the religious expression restrictions is applied
to a government funded program. For instance, religious instruction or worship
directed toward overcoming drug addiction might be considered by some as
"quintessentially religious" or "decidedly religious in nature," but it can "also be
characterized properly as the teaching of [addiction recovery] from a particular
viewpoint., 39 Denying funding to such expression, as required under a broad
construction, constitutes viewpoint discrimination.
This discrimination is evident in a settlement agreement 4° entered into
by the parties in ACLU v. Foster.4 1 The agreement establishes parameters under
which the State of Louisiana will in the future administer funds for abstinence
programs operated by faith-based organizations. It is important to note that
these government funds are provided pursuant to a federal program created to
"teach[] the social, psychological and health gains to be realized by abstaining
from sexual activity. Such teaching is to include, among other things, the
message that "a mutually faithful monogamous relationship in context of mar-
riage is the expected standard of human sexual activity., 43 Pursuant to the set-
tlement agreement, participating faith-based organizations will be required by
the state to certify each month that "no activity, event, or material created or
supported in whole or in part with [government] funds has included religious
content; [and] that no [government] funds have been used to advocate or pro-
mote, through prayer or otherwise, religion or religious messages."
These conditions create fundamentally the same kind of viewpoint dis-
crimination that the Court struck down in Good News Club.an By excluding
religious messages and religious content, the settlement agreement establishes a
program under which funded participants may invoke any theoretical foundation
for the social and psychological benefits of abstinence, or for the promotion of
37 Id. at 265-66.
38 Id. at 269.
39 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111.
40 This settlement agreement is on file with the author.
41 No. 02-1440, 2002 WL 1733651 (E.D. La. July 24, 2002).
42 42 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2)(A) (2000).
43 Id. § 710(b)(2)(D).
44 See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
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a mutually faithful monogamous relationship in the context of marriage,
except a religious one. For instance, the program will fund the message that
abstinence protects you from emotional vulnerability to others and thereby im-
proves your self-image, making you a more well-adjusted member of society
and ultimately more happy and fulfilled. But it will not fund the message that
abstinence promotes emotional dependence on God, resulting in deeper, more
meaningful relationships and an abiding sense of joy. This is viewpoint dis-
crimination at its core: two perspectives on the social and psychological bene-
fits of abstinence, one funded and the other excluded.
B. A Broad Construction of the Restricted Religious Expression Violates
Free Speech Rights Under Velazquez
Depending upon their nature, some government funding programs (such
as the one at at issue in Rosenberger) may implicate free speech rights under
speech forum doctrine. The Court has held that when the government creates a
speech forum of any kind, it must maintain a position of neutrality with respect
to viewpoints on topics within the scope of the forum;45 the government "must
not discriminate against [religious] speech on the basis of viewpoint. ''46 But free
speech rights are also implicated in government subsidy programs that do not
create a speech forum.47 Indeed, the existence of viewpoint discrimination in
such programs strongly indicates that they violate the Free Speech Clause.
In Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez,48 the Court struck down a
provision in the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") Act that prohibited partici-
pating lawyers from representing clients in cases involving "an effort to amend
or otherwise challenge existing welfare law. ' 49 A five Justice majority held that
the government may not impose substantial and harmful restrictions on the
speech of grantee organizations in connection with government aid programs
"designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental mes-
sage. ' '50 The Court noted that "when the government disburses public funds to
private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by
the grantee."'', However, "it does not follow ... that viewpoint-based restric-
45 Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
46 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07 (citations omitted).
47 See generally Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1377 (2001); Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151
(1996).
48 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
49 Id. at 537.
50 Id. at 542.
51 Id. at 541 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833).
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tions are proper when the government does not itself speak or subsidize trans-
mittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity
of views from private speakers.,
52
The Court cited two factors in support of its conclusion that the LSC
Act was designed to facilitate private speech. First, the Court concluded that the
government did not intend to convey a particular message under the LSC Act,
but rather to fund attorneys to speak on behalf of welfare claimants. The Court
observed that in suits for welfare benefits, the LSC lawyer "is not the govern-
ment's speaker. The attorney defending the decision to deny benefits will de-
liver the government's message., 53 Second, the Court observed that the LSC
Act seeks to use an "existing medium of expression," namely the state and fed-
eral court system, to accomplish its objective of assisting welfare claimants.54
In short, "the program presumes that private, nongovernmental speech is neces-
sary, and a substantial restriction is placed upon that speech.,
55
Having established that the LSC Act "funds constitutionally protected
expression," the Court identified a number of harms arising from the restriction
on speech.56 For instance, the Court noted that the restrictions on representation
"distort[] the legal system by altering the traditional role of attorneys . . ..
Specifically, the "restriction imposed by the statute... threatens severe impair-
ment of the judicial function" because it attempts "to draw lines around the LSC
program to exclude from litigation those arguments and theories Congress finds
unacceptable but which by their nature are within the province of the courts to
consider.,
58
The Court also noted that the restrictions impose a significant impact on
welfare claimants since, "in cases where the attorney withdraws from a repre-
sentation, the client is unlikely to find other counsel., 59 As a result, "with re-
spect to litigation services Congress has funded, there is no alternative channel
for expression of the advocacy Congress seeks to restrict. 6 °
The rationale of the majority in Velazquez applies with equal force to
the restrictions on "sectarian worship, instruction or proselytization" in govern-
ment-funded programs subject to charitable choice. First, the government does
not intend to convey any particular "programmatic message," in many (if not
52 Id. at 542 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 543-44.
55 Id.
56 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548.
57 Id. at 544.
58 Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
59 Id.
60 Id.
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all) such programs. 6 1 With respect to the SAMHSA program, funds are pro-
vided for programs that either (1) provide "comprehensive community mental
health services to adults with serious mental illness and to children with a seri-
ous emotional disturbance" or (2) plan, carry out or evaluate "activities to pre-
vent and treat substance abuse. 62 Nothing in the SAMHSA sections suggest
that the government intends to convey any particular message, or prefer any
particular viewpoint, with respect to the treatment of mental illness or substance
abuse.
63
Second, the government-funded programs use "existing mediums of ex-
pression," faith-based and community social service organizations, to accom-
plish their objectives. Faith-based organizations are, practically by definition,
expressive associations. The expression of religious commitment, in words or
merely by action, is central to their interaction with the surrounding community
and their self-identity. 64 Further, in many of its programs, the government pre-
sumes that the private, nongovernmental speech of the service providers is nec-
essary to accomplishing the program objectives, whether training for welfare-to-
work or counseling on overcoming addiction.
Finally, the religious expression restrictions, broadly interpreted, impose
substantial harm on the speech of faith-based organizations and on the social
service system. Religious viewpoints and approaches have traditionally consti-
tuted a fundamental component of the social service system and are by their
nature within the province of the faith-based organizations that provide social
services.65 Broad restrictions effectively "draw lines around" the funded social
services to exclude the uniquely religious viewpoints and approaches to the de-
livery of such services offered by faith-based organizations. In essence, such
restrictions require many faith-based organizations to surrender their core iden-
tity, and their distinct contribution to the delivery of social services, in order to
participate in the program. As a result, broad religious expression restrictions
distort the social service system by altering the traditional role of private faith-
based organizations in the same manner that the LSC Act restrictions "distort[]
the legal system by altering the traditional role of attorneys.' 66 Further, such
restrictions "severely impair" participating faith-based organizations and the
social service system as a whole.
61 Id. at 548.
62 42 U.S.C. §§ 300x-l(a), 21(b).
63 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300x-5, 31 (setting forth conditions on the use of funds).
64 Cf Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts is an
expressive association).
65 See THE WHITE HOUSE, UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD: BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION BY FAITH-
BASED AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS IN FEDERAL SOCIAL SERVICE PROGRAMS (2001) (discuss-
ing the role of faith-based organizations in the social service system), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/unlevelfield.html.
66 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 544.
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In addition, a broad construction of the restrictions may impose a sig-
nificant impact on social service recipients since, in situations where faith-based
organizations are not eligible to express their viewpoints on social services sup-
ported by government-funded programs, the recipients may be unable to find
other sources for such viewpoints or for such services provided from a religious
perspective. Just as with the representation funded by the LSC Act, the services
funded by government programs may not be generally available from privately
funded sources.6 7 Indeed, once the government enters a particular social service
segment, it may become difficult to raise private funds to provide services in
that segment. As a result, with respect to social services Congress has funded,
there may be in many cases no alternative channel available to recipients for
expression of the viewpoints restricted under a broad construction.
In support of its analysis, the Velazquez majority referred to several
cases in which government speech restrictions were struck down under a forum
analysis. The Court concluded that "just as the government in those cases could
not elect to use a broadcasting network or a college publication structure in a
regime which prohibits speech necessary to the proper functioning of those sys-
tems, so it may not design a subsidy to effect this serious and fundamental re-
striction on advocacy of attorneys and the functioning of the judiciary.,,68 Simi-
larly, the government may not elect to use faith-based organizations in a pro-
gram that prohibits the religious viewpoints and approaches that are a defining
characteristic of many such organizations and an integral part of the social ser-
vice system.
C. A Broad Construction of the Restricted Religious Expression Also
Violates Free Speech Rights Under Finley and Simon & Schuster
The Velazquez dissent asserted that free speech rights are implicated in
government subsidy programs only if (1) the funding program creates a forum
for speech or (2) the speech restrictions in the program are "aimed at the sup-
pression of dangerous ideas," or "threaten[] to drive certain ideas or viewpoints
from the marketplace." 69 The dissent cited National Endowment for Arts v.
Finley,70 a case in which the Court rejected a free speech challenge to a statutory
provision governing the National Endowment for the Arts ("NEA") that re-
quired the NEA to "tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency and
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public."'', Noting that
"the First Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy context," the
67 Id. at 546.
68 Id. at 544.
69 Id. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) and
Nat'l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998)).
70 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
71 Id. at 572.
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Court in Finley distinguished the challenged restrictions from those creating a
"disproportionate burden calculated to drive 'certain ideas or viewpoints from
the marketplace."'
7 2
In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims
Board,73 the Court struck down a law which required income from published
works of an accused or convicted criminal describing his crime to be deposited
in an escrow account for the benefit of the criminal's victims and creditors. The
Court noted that the law at issue "plainly imposes a financial disincentive only
on speech of a particular content., 74 The Court stated that "the government's
ability to impose content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the
government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the market-
place. 75
The Court in Rosenberger held that just such a result follows from a re-
striction on all religious expression. In rejecting the dissent's "assertion that no
viewpoint discrimination occurs" when a restriction applies to an entire class of
viewpoints, the Court stated:
[o]ur understanding of the complex and multifaceted nature of
public discourse has not embraced such a contrived description
of the marketplace of ideas. If the topic of debate is, for exam-
ple, racism, then exclusion of several views on that problem is
just as offensive to the First Amendment as exclusion of only
one. It is as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and an
atheistic perspective on the debate as it is to exclude one, the
other, or yet another political, economic, or social viewpoint.76
Rosenberger recognized the impact that the government can have on the
marketplace of ideas. In this regard,
[i]t should be remembered that when the First Amendment was
proposed and ratified, the government had little or no involve-
ment in education, social welfare, or the formation and trans-
mission of culture. These functions were predominantly left to
the private sphere, and within the private sphere religious insti-
tutions played a leading role. As the government has assumed
wider and wider responsibility for the funding and regulation of
72 Id. at 587 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
73 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
74 Id. at 116.
75 Id.
76 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) (em-
phasis added).
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these functions, the idea of a "secular state" has become more
and more ominous. When the state is the dominant influence in
the culture, the "secular state" becomes the equivalent of a
secular culture. Religious influences are confined to those seg-
ments of society in which the government is not involved,
which is to say that religion is confined to the margins of na-
tional life-to those areas not important enough to have re-
ceived the helping or controlling hand of government.
77
By eliminating all religious viewpoints on subject matters within the
scope of a government program, a broad construction of the religious expression
restrictions would "threaten to drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the mar-
ketplace. 78 In the context of a government subsidy, the marketplace of ideas is
defined by the objectives of the program (e.g., addiction recovery or job skills).
If the government funds only nonreligious viewpoints on or approaches to such
objectives, it puts religious viewpoints and ideas at a significant disadvantage in
the marketplace. It is no response in this context to say that faith-based organi-
zations can present such viewpoints and ideas without government funds. While
that is clearly correct, it does not account for the impact on the marketplace of
the government funding. As discussed above, this impact may be of such mag-
nitude that it would effectively overwhelm the presence of religious viewpoints
and approaches in the marketplace as defined by the objectives of the govern-
ment program. 7
9
D. A Broad Construction of the Restricted Religious Expression Is Not
Supported by Rust
The Velazquez dissent also argued that the restrictions in the LSC Act
were indistinguishable from restrictions in a funding program upheld in Rust v.
Sullivan.80 The program at issue in Rust "authorized grants for the provision of
family planning services, but provided that 'none of the funds.., shall be used
in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.' 8 ' The implement-
ing regulations further provided that organizations receiving government funds
under the program could not refer clients to an abortion provider for prenatal
services.8 2 In upholding these restrictions against a free speech challenge, the
77 Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty The "First Freedom"?, 21 CARDOzO L.
REv. 1243, 1261 (2000).
78 Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 552 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
80 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
81 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 553 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 178).
82 Id.
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Court in Rust made the general observation that "[t]he Government can, without
violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain ac-
tivities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding
an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way."
83
More specifically, the Court noted that the abortion restrictions are consistent
with the focus of the program on family planning as opposed to prenatal care.
84
In this regard, the program restrictions did not present "a case of Government
'suppressing a dangerous idea,' but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its
employees from engaging in activities outside of the project's scope. 85
Clearly, Rust indicates that not all expressive restrictions associated
with government aid implicate free speech rights. The Velazquez majority ob-
served that viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in "instances,
like Rust, in which the government 'used private speakers to transmit specific
information pertaining to its own program.',, 86 In Rosenberger, the Court ex-
plained that Rust stood for the proposition that "when the government appropri-
ates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say
what it wishes." 87 However, "[n]either the latitude for government speech nor
its rationale applies to subsidies for private speech in every instance. 88
The actual language in the Rust and Velazquez opinions does not clearly
delineate the limits of the respective cases. One key question is whether the
government, in funding private speech through a particular program, is intend-
ing to "transmit specific information" or "promote a particular policy of its
own." 89 In answering this question, the Court has noted that "Congress cannot
recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in every case,
lest the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic exercise." 9 This is
particularly the case where there is no basis for asserting that the conditions are
meaningfully related to the objectives of the program. In this regard, a broad
construction appears less like an attempt to ensure that the recipient conveys a
particular governmental message or policy than it does an effort to suppress all
religious viewpoints on any such message or policy (assuming there is one).
Because it restricts expressive activities that are otherwise clearly directed to-
ward government program objectives, a broad construction cannot readily be
83 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
94 Id.
85 Id. at 194.
86 Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rec-
tor and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
87 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 194).
88 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542.
89 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (emphasis added).
90 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 547.
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characterized as a condition that defines the scope of the program (i.e., a condi-
tion that brings a program under Rust).91
Similarly, even in those government programs where there is a particu-
lar policy or message that the government is promoting (e.g., abstinence), Rust
does not support the exclusion of all religious viewpoints on the message.92
Although Rust permits restrictions on expression outside the scope of the pro-
gram, it says nothing about restrictions on expression otherwise within the scope
of the program.9 3 By way of contrast, a narrow construction of the restrictions
fits nicely within the parameters of Rust, excluding only content outside the
scope of the program and ensuring that only expression in furtherance of the
particular program objectives is funded. In short, a broad construction of the
religious activity restrictions aligns more closely with the rationale underlying
Velazquez than with that underlying Rust.
91 One difficulty in reconciling Rust and Velazquez arises from the differing levels of general-
ity the Court used in articulating the applicable government policy. In Rust the Court construed
the policy narrowly (distinguishing family planning from prenatal services), but in Velazquez the
Court defined it broadly (providing access to the legal system). The selected degree of abstraction
in each case, although perhaps not determinative of the outcome, certainly pointed strongly to it.
But regardless of the selected level of abstraction, the government cannot have as an objective
hostility to private viewpoints because they are religiously-informed. See, e.g., Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) ("In our Establishment
Clause cases we have often stated the principle that the First Amendment forbids an official pur-
pose to disapprove of a particular religion or religion in general."); Am. Family Ass'n v. City and
County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002). The special status of private religious
viewpoints under the Religion Clauses distinguishes religious expression restrictions from the
abortion restrictions in Rust. The government is not constitutionally prohibited from expressing
disfavor for abortion (even though it must protect a women's right to choose an abortion). The
expression of such disfavor is a constitutionally legitimate governmental objective whereas the
expression of disfavor for private religious viewpoints is not. In contrast to the restrictions upheld
in Rust, a government program that permits all private viewpoints on a particular subject matter
except those from a religious perspective might reasonably be characterized as expressing disfavor
for private religious viewpoints. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98,
118 (2001) (noting "the danger that [schoolchildren] would perceive a hostility toward the reli-
gious viewpoint if [a Bible club] were excluded from [a] public forum.").
92 See Post, supra note 47, at 168 (arguing that restrictions on subsidized speech must at least
be "instrumentally necessary" to the attainment of legitimate governmental purposes). There is no
rational relationship between advancing the government's message (defined without respect to
religion) and suppressing all private religious viewpoints that advance the message.
93 With respect to the program at issue in Foster, it cannot reasonably be said that religious
perspectives on the social and psychological benefits of abstinence, and on the "expected standard
of human sexuality," are outside the scope of the program. There is no statutory basis for such an
assertion and, indeed, the settlement agreement does not even make this assertion. See supra
notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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E. A Broad Construction of the Restricted Religious Expression Is More
Likely to Implicate Free Exercise Rights
Because broad restrictions on religious expression are not neutral with
respect to religion (i.e., they constitute religious viewpoint discrimination), they
violate not only the Free Speech Clause, but also the Free Exercise Clause.
With respect to the Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court has held that "a
law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compel-
ling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening
a particular religious practice. ''94 However, "[a] law failing to satisfy these re-
quirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be
narrowly tailored to advance that interest.
' 95
As an initial matter, the religious expression restrictions, broadly con-
strued, are not neutral with respect to religion because they use religious criteria
to determine whether or not a particular expressive activity may be funded. The
Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah96 stated that
"the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its
face."97 The Court noted that "[a] law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a reli-
gious practice without a secular meaning discernible from the language or con-
text.' '98 As discussed above, a broad construction of the religious expression
restrictions refers and applies specifically to religious viewpoints on and ap-
proaches to the delivery of social services. Because religion is their defining
characteristic, such viewpoints and approaches clearly have no secular meaning.
Therefore, a broad construction of the restrictions does not even satisfy the
minimum requirement of facial neutrality.
99
94 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (citing
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
95 Id. at 531-32. Broad restrictions may also create unconstitutional conditions since they
require religious organizations to forego their free speech and free exercise rights as a condition of
participating in a government-funded program and this requirement is not justified by the objec-
tives of the program. For instance, in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), the Supreme Court
unanimously struck down a Tennessee law prohibiting ministers from holding elective office in
the state legislature. The plurality opinion held that the law was subject to strict scrutiny because
it imposed an unconstitutional condition on the free exercise of ministers. Id. at 626 (plurality)
(citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)); see id. at 633 (Brennan, J., concurring). As
applied in federal law, a broad construction of the restrictions may also be subject to strict scrutiny
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (1993).
96 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
97 Id. at 533.
98 Id.
99 Construed narrowly, the restrictions can be understood as merely one category, among
many, of nonqualifying activity. In this context, the requirements of facial neutrality are more
readily satisfied.
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The Ninth Circuit recently applied this analysis to a scholarship pro-
gram in the State of Washington.' °° The scholarship program was open to all
students with qualifying academic and family income status who chose to attend
an accredited post-secondary institution in Washington. However, students
meeting these criteria were not eligible for scholarships if they chose to pursue a
degree in theology.' 0' The court concluded that this exclusion violated the Free
Exercise Clause because it was not neutral with respect to religion.102 The court
distinguished the scholarship program from the funding program at issue in Rust
on the basis that the scholarship program was not set up to present the govern-
ment's message but rather "to fund the educational pursuits of students." 03 in
such a program, the court ruled that the government must maintain viewpoint
neutrality, particularly with respect to religion. The court concluded that "[a]
state law may not offer a benefit to all . . ., but exclude some on the basis of
religion." 1°4 Because the scholarship program was "administered so as to dis-
qualify only students who pursue a degree in theology from receiving its bene-
fits," it failed the requirement of facial neutrality. 1
05
The lack of neutrality is also evident in the fact that the religious ex-
pression restrictions, broadly construed, are unrelated to the interests furthered
by the government program. In other words, such restrictions serve not to pro-
tect or promote the interests of the government program, but rather merely to
distinguish between favored and unfavored expression. In Lukumi, the Court
evaluated several city ordinances that banned the ritual sacrifice of animals;
these laws directly burdened the religious practice of local members of the San-
teria religion, who challenged the laws in court.10 6 The Court held that the ordi-
nances were not neutral in part because they were drafted to suppress religious
conduct without reference to the legitimate ends asserted in their defense.'0 7
The Court acknowledged that the ordinances address concerns "unrelated to
religious animosity" such as public health and prevention of cruelty to ani-
100 See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002).
101 See id. at 750.
102 See id.
103 Id. at 752.
104 Id. at 754 (comparing the scholarship program to the law struck down in McDaniel).
105 Id. Having established that the scholarship program implicates free exercise concerns by
discriminating against religion, the court examined the State's justifications for the restriction
under strict scrutiny. The court concluded that the State's interest in complying with its own
constitutional prohibition against funding religious education was not compelling. Id. at 760. The
court noted that funds would reach religious institutions only as a result of the "private choice" of
recipients to pursue a religious education. Id. (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460
(2002) (upholding school voucher program that included religious schools)).
106 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525-28 (1993).
107 See id. at 535-40.
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mals. 0 8 However, in reading the ordinances together, the Court concluded that
they "disclose an object remote from these legitimate concerns."'1 9 Specifically,
"although Santeria sacrifice is prohibited, killings that are no more necessary or
humane in almost all other circumstances are unpunished."'" 0 The same "re-
mote object" may appear with respect to broad religious expression restrictions
that are unrelated to ensuring that government funds only go to activities that
further the government's objectives."' In short, "a law which visits 'gratuitous
restrictions on religious conduct' ... seeks not to effectuate the stated govern-
mental interests, but to suppress the conduct because of its religious motiva-
tion."' 12
A law also lacks neutrality if it improperly favors certain types of reli-
gious organizations over others. In Larson v. Valente," 3 the Court stated that
"the fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government ... ef-
fect no favoritism among sects ... and that it work deterrence of no religious
belief."' '4 The state law at issue in Larson required charitable and religious
organizations soliciting contributions to register with the state and submit peri-
odic reports on its solicitation activities. The law contained an exemption, how-
ever, for religious organizations that received more than half of their total con-
tributions from members or affiliated organizations."15 The law was challenged
by a religious organization that did not qualify for the exemption.
In striking down the exemption, the Court held that even though the dis-
tinction between covered and exempt religious organizations was formally neu-
tral in that it did not turn on religious criteria, the exemption was not actually
108 Id. at 535.
109 Id.
1l0 Id. at 536.
III In Davey, the Ninth Circuit noted that the exclusion of students pursuing a degree in theol-
ogy from the scholarship program "has nothing to do with the purpose or point of the program.
To the extent that the message behind the [scholarship program] is that doing well in high school
pays off, and that going to college in Washington is a good thing, and that developing the talents
of promising students is of great importance to the state, it is qualified with the message 'unless
the student pursues a degree in theology from a religious perspective."' 299 F.3d at 756.
12 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 538; see also Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973 (6th Cir. 1995) (striking
down under the Free Exercise Clause day care licensing regulations at military bases that prohib-
ited any religious activities).
113 456 U.S. 228 (1982)
114 Id. at 246 (quotation omitted). Even though Larson was decided under the Establishment
Clause, the Court applied the same strict scrutiny test once it determined that the law at issue did
not treat all religious denominations equally. Id. at 247. Further, the Court in Larson expressly
noted that the "constitutional prohibition of denominational preferences is inextricably connected
with the continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 245.
115 Id. at 231-32.
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neutral with respect to religion." 16 Rather, the Court determined that the criteria
"effectively distinguishe[d] between well-established churches that have
achieved strong but not total financial support from their members . . .and
churches which are new and lacking in a constituency, or which, as a matter of
policy, may favor public solicitation over general reliance on financial support
,,117from members .... As a result, the statute was "not simply a facially neutral
statute, the provisions of which happen to have a 'disparate impact' upon differ-
ent religious organizations," but rather the statute made "explicit and deliberate
distinctions between different religious organizations."" 8
In University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 119 the District of Columbia Circuit
Court struck down the "substantial religious character" test used by the NLRB
to determine whether it may exercise jurisdiction over a religious employer.
This test involved, among other things, an examination of the religious beliefs of
the student body and faculty and a determination of the extent to which other
views are tolerated on campus. 120 In support of its conclusion, the court noted
that, by failing to exempt institutions with a more objectively secular approach
to education, the test "may minimize the legitimacy of the beliefs expressed by
the religious entity."' 12' The court correctly observed that if an entity "is ecu-
menical and open-minded, that does not make it any less religious.' 122 There-
fore, "[t]o limit the . . . exemption to religious institutions with hard-nosed
proselytizing [and] that [serve only] members of their religion. .. is an unneces-
sarily stunted view of the law, and perhaps even itself a violation of the most
basic command of the Establishment Clause - not to prefer some religions (and
thereby some approaches to indoctrinating religion) to others." 23
The Great Falls court concluded that failing to exempt religious institu-
tions that take a "secular" approach to the delivery of educational services cre-
ates an unconstitutional preference. The same result applies to the exclusion
from government-funded programs of religious organizations that take a reli-
gious approach to the delivery of social services. In other words, the disparate
treatment of religious expression under a broad construction of the restrictions is
of the same fundamental character as the treatment struck down in Great Falls
and in Larson. Broadly construed restrictions make "explicit and deliberate
distinctions" that "effectively distinguish" between religious institutions with
116 Id. at 246.
117 Id. at 247 n.23 (citation and quotation omitted).
118 Id.
19 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1345.
122 Id. at 1346.
123 Id. (citing Larson, 456 U.S. at 244).
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different approaches to the provision of social services. Those institutions that
deliver such services from an overtly religious perspective are excluded, while
those institutions whose approach is more objectively secular (but in some sense
covertly religious) are included.
Finally, a broad construction of the restrictions creates an impermissible
governmental incentive for religious institutions to adjust their theology and
form of ministry. 24 For instance, religious institutions have an incentive to
"tone down" the extent to which they express their religious views in the deliv-
ery of social services. These incentives work deterrence on religious doctrine
that emphasizes an overt approach to expression.
In applying the neutrality requirement of the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court has stated that it must "survey meticulously the circumstances of govern-
mental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders.' 25 With re-
spect to a broad construction of the religious expression restrictions, the survey
is not difficult. By its express terms, its relationship to the government program
objectives, its disparate impact and its incentives, a broad construction fails to
comply with the neutrality principles articulated by Lukumi and Larson.
F. The Errors of the District Court in McCallum
In Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum,126 a federal
district court expressly considered, and rejected, several free speech and free
exercise arguments related to broad restrictions on religious expression in a
government aid program. The case involved a challenge by taxpayers to certain
grants made by the state of Wisconsin to a faith-based organization that engaged
in integrated religious activities. With respect to the free speech issues, the
court concluded that "[tihe state of Wisconsin's decision to contract with private
entities to deliver a portion of its social services does not create, encourage or
otherwise facilitate private speech."'' 27 This conclusion rested on the proposition
in Rust that the government has a message it wishes to convey through the
funded program. But the court merely assumed the existence of such a message
without even identifying it or considering the alternative proposition. In this
regard, the court apparently believed it was sufficient to conclude that the gov-
ernment did not intend to create a forum for speech through the program. 28
However, Velazquez and Finley make clear that private speech issues arise in
government aid programs even where the programs do not create a forum for
124 See Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 343-44 (1980) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (discussing the incentives that would result from a rule distinguishing between the secular
and religious activities of a religious organization).
125 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
126 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
127 Id. at 980.
128 Id.
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speech. Indeed, the court did not even consider the extent to which the
Velazquez factors might apply to restrictions on speech in this program.
Further, the court overstated the authority of the government to restrict
speech under Rust by holding that the restrictions may apply even to viewpoints
on subjects within the scope of the government program. 9 As discussed above,
the Supreme Court made it quite clear that the restrictions on speech in Rust
were permissible in part because they only excluded speech outside the scope of
the program. 30 Rust provides no support for the proposition that the govern-
ment may restrict viewpoints on speech otherwise within the scope of the pro-
gram. Finally, the court indicated that the restrictions on religious speech re-
quired by its decision only amount to "content-based" exclusions, 3 1 a charac-
terization clearly inconsistent with the analysis of religious expression restric-
tions in Good News Club.
132
In short, the McCallum court's analysis of the free speech issues failed
to consider the significance of several important cases, and it misread the case
upon which it primarily relied. Similarly, the court's free exercise analysis
failed to consider the rights of faith-based organizations, focusing instead only
on service beneficiaries. Further, the court did not consider the lack of neutral-
ity arising from the imposition of broad religious expression restrictions, nor did
it apply a strict scrutiny analysis to such restrictions. In light of these deficien-
cies, the court's analysis provides no basis for concluding that the government
may impose broad religious expression restrictions on faith-based organizations
without infringing upon free speech or free exercise rights.
IV. A NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF THE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION
RESTRICTIONS SATISFIES ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE REQUIREMENTS
In its most recent cases, the Court has used three primary criteria to
"guide the determination of whether a government-aid program impermissibly
advances religion: (1) whether the aid results in governmental indoctrination,
(2) whether the aid program defines its recipients by reference to religion, and
(3) whether the aid creates an excessive entanglement between government and
religion."'1 33 The second and third criteria rarely apply, leaving the analysis of
governmental indoctrination as the primary factor. To avoid governmental in-
doctrination of religion, the Court has held that direct government subsidy pro-
129 Id.
130 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
131 McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 980.
132 See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
133 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 845 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)).
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grams must be structured so as to ensure that the aid is not diverted to certain
types of religious activities.
1 34
This holding creates a potential dilemma related to the permissible
scope of restrictions that preclude individuals from engaging in protected reli-
gious expressive activity in connection with their performance of activities
funded in whole or in part with government funds. Specifically, to the extent
that the Establishment Clause prohibits direct funding of expression that, but for
its religious content, falls within the scope of the funded program, the
Establishment Clause constraints conflict with the free speech and free exercise
rights of the religious organizations.
This dilemma may be resolved in two ways. First, the Establishment
Clause can be read as prohibiting only those types of religious activities that do
not implicate free speech or free exercise rights in a particular program. Sec-
ond, where the Establishment Clause prohibits activity otherwise protected by
the Free Speech (or Free Exercise) Clause, either one or the other of the clauses
must be held to trump. As discussed below, the Court has left open the first
alternative by never expressly holding that the Establishment Clause requires a
broad construction of the religious expression restrictions. With respect to the
second alternative, the Court has not expressly committed to a position.
A. The United States Supreme Court Has Not Held That the Establishment
Clause Requires a Broad Construction of Religious Expression
Restrictions
Although the Court's rulings suggest that restrictions must generally be
in place to ensure that government funds are not used for "religious indoctrina-
tion" activities,135 the Court has never been required to identify any such activi-
ties in the context of a government aid program, or to describe precisely the
religious character and context of such activities. Specifically, the Court has not
discussed the meaning of any particular terms used to describe the private reli-
gious expression that must not be funded by the government under a religiously
neutral aid program. Even more specifically, there is no Supreme Court guid-
ance available in government aid cases as to what types of activities constitute
"sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization" for purposes of attributing
religious indoctrination to the government.
134 See id. at 840-42 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (holding, in contrast with the plurality, that
actual diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination is not consistent with the Establish-
ment Clause); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 621 (1988) (holding that a government aid pro-
gram may violate the Establishment Clause if the funds are expended on "specifically religious
activities").
135 See, e.g., Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 759 (1976) (plurality);
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 867 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see infra note 143-
46 and accompanying text.
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Instead of identifying any particular religious activities that constitute
impermissible religious indoctrination, the Court has merely held in each case
that the structure of the aid and the conditions prohibiting use of funds for cer-
tain generically defined religious activities provided sufficient separation be-
tween the expression and the government. In Mitchell v. Helms,136 the Court
considered a school aid program that prohibited the use of the aid for "religious
worship or instruction. Without parsing the meaning of these words, Justice
O'Connor in her concurring opinion simply concluded that the restriction (to-
gether with other factors) was sufficient to avoid Establishment Clause viola-
tions. She stated that "[r]egardless of whether these factors are constitutional
requirements, they are surely sufficient to find that the program at issue here
does not have the impermissible effect of advancing religion."'138 Even the evi-
dence cited by Justice O'Connor of de minimis violations does not yield any
useful insight into the meaning of the terms "religious worship or instruction."
Justice O'Connor noted that there was evidence suggesting that a second grade
teacher may have used the government materials "in all subjects," and that one
religious school may have used some materials in its theology classes. 139 How-
ever, because the scope of the activity constituting the presumed diversion was
de minimis, there was no need to consider whether use of the materials in par-
ticular classes having religious content actually constituted use for religious
worship or instruction.140
In Agostini v. Felton,14 1 the Court based its finding that there was no
impermissible governmental indoctrination of religion in part on the lack of
evidence that any government-funded teachers had "attempted to inculcate relig-
ion in students."'' 42 As a result, the Court gave no consideration as to exactly
what type of teaching would constitute an inculcation of religion.
In Bowen v. Kendrick,143 the Court rejected a facial Establishment
Clause challenge to the Adolescent Family Life Act, which provided for grants
to private nonprofit organizations (including religious organizations) for coun-
seling and educational services related to adolescent sexual relations and preg-
136 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
137 Id. at 849 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
138 Id. at 867 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139 Id. at 864.
140 A similar result applies with respect to 191 religious library books borrowed by the schools
under the government program. Because the school conceded that the books were not "secular,
neutral and nonideological" as required under the program, there is no discussion in the case as to
why the particular religious content in the books violated these terms.
141 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
142 Id. at 228.
143 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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nancy.' nn Even though the terms of the Act did not expressly restrict the funding
of religious activity, the Court held that the Act was not unconstitutional on its
face.145 The Court noted that although many of the services to be performed
"involve some sort of education or counseling .... there is nothing inherently
religious about these activities."' 46 Similarly, the approach to adolescent sexual-
ity and pregnancy favored by the Act, emphasizing self-discipline and adoption,
"is not inherently religious, although it may coincide with the approach taken by
certain religions.' ' 47 The court stated that "the alignment of the statute and the
religious views of the grantees [does not] run afoul of our proscription against
'fund[ing] a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular
setting."",148 The Court explained that "facially neutral projects" such as adop-
tion counseling and educational services are not converted into "[specifically
religious] activities by the fact that they are carried out by organizations with
religious affiliations."'
149
With respect to the as-applied challenge, the Court remanded the case
for determination as to whether any grants had been made to "pervasively sec-
tarian" organizations, or whether any funds had been used for "specifically reli-
gious activities" or for "materials that have an explicitly religious content or are
designed to inculcate the views of a particular religious faith."'15 But the Court
provided little guidance regarding how to make such determinations.15' As an
initial matter, the Court provided no definition of what constitutes a "specifi-
cally religious" (or "inherently religious") activity. The Court did state that
"evidence that the views espoused on questions such as premarital sex, abortion,
and the like happen to coincide with the religious views of the AFLA grantee
would not be sufficient to show that the grant funds are being used in such a
way as to have a primary effect of advancing religion."'152 However, it did not
explain how to distinguish such views from the "views of a particular religious
faith."'
153
144 Id. at 593-94.
145 Id. at 618.
146 Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
147 Id. (emphasis added).
148 Id. at 613 (citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)) (emphasis added).
149 Id.
150 Id. at 621.
151 Further, although the Court agreed that the record contained evidence of "specific incidents
of impermissible behavior by grantees," id. at 620, it did not identify the incidents or explain why
they were impermissible.
152 Id. at 621.
153 Similarly, although the Court stated that the district court, in finding that several grantees
were "pervasively sectarian," had not "discuss[ed] with any particularity the aspects of those
organizations which in its view warranted classification as 'pervasively sectarian,' id. at 620, the
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Bowen could be read as distinguishing between the expression of views
using "secular" language and the expression of the same views using language
that is identifiably religious (e.g., explicit references to religious texts). How-
ever, this is precisely the distinction that the Court subsequently rejected as
viewpoint discrimination in Good News Club.154 In this regard, it is important to
note that the Bowen court did not address free speech issues in its analysis; in-
deed, the case was decided a decade before Finley and Velazquez. Therefore,
the Court had no need to consider how such issues might impact the definition
of "inherently" or "specifically" religious activities, or how they might limit the
extent to which such expression may be restricted. In fact, these issues dictate a
more narrow reading of Bowen, one that equates "inherently" or "specifically"
religious activities with "exclusively" religious activities.
155
Nothing in the analysis or holding of the case prohibits such a reading.
Indeed, at least one aspect of the opinion supports such a narrow interpretation.
In response to the assertion that the challenged statutory program did not contain
any "express provision preventing the use of federal funds for religious pur-
poses," the Court observed that it has "never stated that a statutory restriction is
constitutionally required."' 156 Instead, the Court suggested that the limited pur-
poses for the use of funds set forth in the statute were sufficient to ensure that
funds were not used for impermissible religious activities.157 Since religious
expression that furthers these purposes would not be excluded by such a statu-
tory limitation, the Court's analysis implies that only religious expression unre-
Court did not provide any guidance as to what aspects make a religious organization "pervasively
sectarian." The Court merely noted that not all religious organizations are pervasively sectarian.
Id. at 620 n. 16.
154 See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
155 The phrase "sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization" is sometimes characterized as
applying to "inherently religious" activities. See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, GUIDANCE TO FAITH-
BASED AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS ON PARTNERING WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/guidance-document.pdf. Al-
though there does not appear to be any legislative history to support this characterization, it is
consistent with the notion that the phrase is intended to reflect Establishment Clause requirements
as set forth in Bowen. However, the characterization is misleading to the extent it results in a
broader restriction of religious expression than that actually required in Bowen and permitted in
subsequent Free Speech and Free Exercise cases. This article argues that the term "exclusively"
religious is a more accurate characterization.
156 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 614 (1988).
157 Id. at 614 n.13. In this regard, the Court noted that Congress had "expressed the view that
use of funds by grantees to promote religion, or to teach religious doctrines of a particular sect,
would be contrary to the intent of the statute." Id. at 621-22 (citing S. REP. No. 98-496, at 10
(1984)). The Court also noted that the Secretary of Health and Human Services had promulgated
"a series of conditions to each grant, including a prohibition against teaching or promoting relig-
ion." Id. Interestingly, the Court stated that "these strictures may not be coterminous with the
requirements of the Establishment Clause .... I d.
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lated to the government's purposes, i.e., exclusively religious expression, is for-
bidden by the Establishment Clause. 1
58
In Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland,159 the Court upheld a
grant program that provided general purpose grants to qualifying colleges and
universities in the State of Maryland. The grants were subject to the condition
that none of the funds could be used for "sectarian purposes."' 6 A plurality of
the Court held that this restriction was sufficient to ensure that no state funds
were being used to support a "specifically religious activity."' 61 The plurality
then noted that "[w]e have no occasion to elaborate further on what is and is not
a 'specifically religious activity,' for no particular use of the state funds is set
out in this statute."' 162 The plurality merely noted, unhelpfully, that the term
"sectarian purposes" is at least as broad as the phrase "specifically religious
activity."'
163
In Tilton v. Richardson,164 the Court upheld a program that provided
construction grants to institutions of higher education. The program excluded
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for reli-
gious worship, or... primarily in connection with any part of the program of a
school or department of divinity.' 65  The Court stated that these restrictions
helped "ensure that the federally subsidized facilities would be devoted to the
secular and not the religious function of the recipient institutions."1 6 The Court
158 Similarly, in Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), the Court sustained a contract be-
tween the District of Columbia and a private hospital corporation controlled and managed exclu-
sively by members of a sisterhood of the Catholic Church. The contract, which did not have any
restrictions on religious expression or other activities, required the corporation to build and oper-
ate an isolation unit for the treatment of patients with infectious diseases sent to the hospital by the
District. The District agreed to pay for the construction of the unit and for each patient served,
and the hospital was required under its charter to serve all patients. Although the hospital un-
doubtedly engaged in religious expression while providing services, the Court held that the fund-
ing agreement did not violate the Establishment Clause because both the agreement and the corpo-
ration were established to further clear secular purposes. Id. at 298. The Court noted that "[t]here
is no allegation that [the corporation's] hospital work is confined to members of that church or
that in its management the hospital has been conducted so as to violate its charter in the smallest
degree." Id.
159 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
160 Id. at 741.
161 Id. at 759 (plurality).
162 Id. at 760.
163 Id. The plurality did express its expectation that the state would "give a wide berth to 'spe-
cifically religious activity' so as to "minimize constitutional questions." Id. However, this ex-
pectation was not expressed in the context of the religious free speech and viewpoint discrimina-
tion cases that followed Roemer. See supra Part III.
164 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
165 Id. at 675 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 751(a)(2) (1964)).
166 Id. at 679.
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also noted that, according to the record, "some church-related institutions ha[d]
been required to disgorge benefits for failure to obey [the restrictions].' 67
However, the Court's opinion does not identify specifically what activities these
offending institutions conducted, nor does it otherwise discuss the meaning of
the restrictions. As with the cases discussed above, the Court merely concluded
that the restrictions are sufficient for Establishment Clause purposes.
Finally, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,168 the Court struck down two programs
that provided assistance to secular and religious nonpublic elementary and sec-
ondary schools. The assistance consisted of payments for a portion of teacher
salaries as well as for certain materials. Both programs contained restrictions on
religious content that applied both to the courses taught by teachers receiving
salary supplements and to the materials. The Court noted that these restrictions
were "precautions taken in candid recognition that these programs approached,
even if they did not intrude upon, the forbidden areas under the Religion
Clauses."' 69 However, because the Court determined that the programs created
an excessive entanglement between government and religion, it did not reach the
question of whether the restrictions constrain "the principal or primary effect of
the programs to the point where they do not offend the Religion Clauses."'' 70 In
short, the Court provided no guidance as to the necessary scope of religious ac-
tivity restrictions for Establishment Clause purposes.
71
The fact that the Court has not expressly held that the Establishment
Clause requires a broad construction of religious expression restrictions does
not, of course, mean that such a construction is not required. Nonetheless, it
does leave open the possibility that a narrow construction would satisfy the
Establishment Clause, thereby avoiding a conflict between the demands of the
Establishment Clause and those of the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.
In this regard, it is important to note that the Court has not addressed the ques-
tion of whether viewpoint restrictions on truly private religious speech and ac-
tivity are ever justified by the Establishment Clause. In Good News Club, the
Court stated that "it is not clear whether a State's interest in avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation would justify viewpoint discrimination.' 72 One
reason this is not clear is because the Court has repeatedly held that the expres-
167 Id. at 680.
168 403 U.S. 602 (1971),
169 Id. at 613.
170 Id.
171 The Court struck down direct monetary grant programs in both Committee for Public Edu-
cation v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), and Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U.S.
472 (1973). However, the programs at issue in these cases did not have any restrictions on the use
of the funds, meaning that the recipients could use the funds for exclusively religious activities.
172 533 U.S. 98, 113 (2001).
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sion of religious viewpoints by private individuals does not raise any "valid Es-
tablishment Clause interest."
'' 73
In terms of the Court's doctrine, a narrow construction could reflect the
notion that the expression of religious viewpoints or perspectives on government
program objectives does not constitute "religious indoctrination," or that (as
discussed in the next section) such viewpoints or perspectives are not attribut-
able to the government under religiously neutral government aid programs.
B. A Narrow Construction Captures All Religious Indoctrination That
Could Properly Be Attributable to the Government
The question of which particular expressive religious activities must be
restricted in direct government subsidy programs turns in part on the extent to
which any such activities can properly be attributed to the government. In this
regard, the Court's cases suggest that in a government program where partici-
pants are selected without regard to religion (either expressly or covertly), the
only expression that could possibly be attributed to the government is exclu-
sively religious expression outside the scope of the program.
The Court makes clear in Agostini that "the criteria by which an aid
program identifies its beneficiaries [is relevant to assessing] whether any use of
that aid to indoctrinate religion could be attributed to the State.' ' 174 In Mitchell,
the plurality stated that "the question whether governmental aid to religious
schools results in governmental indoctrination is ultimately a question whether
any religious indoctrination that occurs in those schools could reasonably be
attributed to governmental action."' 175  Further, "[iun distinguishing between
indoctrination that is attributable to the State and indoctrination that is not, [the
Court has] consistently turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is
offered to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to their religion."'
176
In short, if "eligibility for aid is determined in a constitutionally permissible
173 Id.; see also Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819
(1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 387 (1993); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar, the Court noted that the state's asserted interest "in
achieving greater separation of church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment
Clause of the Federal Constitution is limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the
Free Speech Clause as well." 454 U.S. at 276. The limited reach of the Establishment Clause is
further demonstrated by the fact that it does not even prohibit certain types of aid for exclusively
religious activities in the context of programs or aid generally available to all charitable organiza-
tions. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (allowing a property tax exemption based
on the conduct of exclusively religious activities where exemptions are also generally available for
other charitable organizations and activities).
174 521 U.S. 203, 230 (1997).
175 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (plurality).
176 Id.; see also id. at 838 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[N]eutrality is an important reason for
upholding government-aid programs against Establishment Clause challenges.").
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manner, any use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the govern-
ment and is thus not of constitutional concern."'
177
Although formal neutrality alone may not be sufficient to ensure that re-
ligious indoctrination carried on by funding recipients is not attributable to the
government, it at least creates a strong presumption against attribution. In
Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth,178 the Court
held that viewpoint neutrality is required in the allocation of funding support to
recognized student organizations at a public university. 179 The Court noted that
this requirement is consistent with its holding in Rosenberger that a public uni-
versity's "adherence to a rule of viewpoint neutrality in administering its student
fee program would prevent 'any mistaken impression that the student newspa-
pers speak for the University.""
80
This presumption applies even though the Court has on several occa-
sions cited "'special Establishment Clause dangers' . . . when money is given to
religious schools or entities directly rather than ... indirectly."'' The Mitchell
plurality explained that "[t]he reason for such concern is not that the form per se
is bad, but that such a form creates special risks that governmental aid will have
the effect of advancing religion (or, even more, a purpose of doing so).' ' 182 in
her concurring opinion in Mitchell, Justice O'Connor stated that "the most im-
portant reason for according special treatment to direct money grants is that this
form of aid falls precariously close to the original object of the Establishment
Clause's prohibition."'183 In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 184 the Court
observed that "for the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment the 'establishment' of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."1 85 But the "spon-
sorship, financial support and active involvement" that was at issue during the
Framers' time involved direct monetary grants disbursed on religious criteria
specifically to accomplish religious indoctrination. I1 6 This is a far cry from the
177 Id. at 820 (plurality).
178 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
179 Id. at 233.
180 Id. (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841).
181 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 818-19 (plurality opinion) (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S.
at 842).
182 Id. at 819 n.8 (plurality).
183 Id. at 856 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
184 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
185 Id. at 668.
186 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-74 (1947) (appendix to opinion of Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (providing the text of James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious
Assessments and the proposed Virginia General Assessment bill); see also Douglas Laycock, The
Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L. J. 43, 48-53 (1997).
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allocation of aid on nonreligious criteria to accomplish program objectives unre-
lated to religious indoctrination. In short, although the Court has identified spe-
cial dangers related to direct monetary grants, it has never indicated exactly how
these special dangers affect the analysis of religious indoctrination in a relig-
iously neutral program. Specifically, it has never held that under such programs
the nature of the aid alone creates attribution.
The principle that neutrality protects against attribution has been recog-
nized in other contexts. In his Finley dissent, Justice Souter argued that "'the
communicative element inherent in the very act of funding itself' is an endorse-
ment of the importance of the arts collectively, not an endorsement of the indi-
vidual message espoused in a given work of art."'' 87 If the expression of an artist
is not attributable to the government when his or her expression is funded by the
NEA, which evaluates the quality of each artist's expressive work, then neither
is the religious expression of a faith-based social service provider that receives
funds without regard to its religious viewpoints.
The foregoing analysis suggests that private religious expression or ex-
ercise, even if it in some sense constitutes religious indoctrination, is not attrib-
utable to the government if it is conducted in furtherance of the objectives of a
religiously neutral program. By way of contrast, religious expression outside
the scope of the program could be attributed to the government because the gov-
ernment would have no reason related to the objectives of the program for fund-
ing such expression. Of course, these activities would be prohibited by a narrow
construction of the religious expression restrictions.
C. Recent Lower Court Cases Have Not Considered the Distinction
Between Narrow and Broad Constructions
The distinction between narrow and broad constructions of restricted re-
ligious expression explains the weakness of several recent lower court cases
striking down direct funding of religious organizations. In DeStefano v.
Emergency Housing Group, Inc., 88 the Second Circuit held that direct, unre-
stricted state funding of an organization whose staff members actively supervise
Alcoholics Anonymous ("AA") meetings and discuss AA literature with clients
violates the Establishment Clause. 89 The court concluded first that AA meet-
ings "are religious as a matter of law" and that the staff s alleged participation
"constitutes 'indoctrination.' ' ' 90 The Court then read Justice O'Connor's con-
currence in Mitchell as generally prohibiting "actual diversion of government
187 524 U.S. at 611 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 892-93, n.11
(Souter, J., dissenting)).
188 247 F.3d 397 (2d Cir. 2001).
189 Id. at 419.
190 Id. at 417.
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aid to religious indoctrination."' 91 Accordingly, the court concluded that "the
neutral administration of the state aid program at issue in this case is an insuffi-
cient constitutional counterweight to the direct public funding of religious ac-
tivities alleged by DeStefano."
1 92
The holding in DeStefano that staff members of a private religious or-
ganization can present (or "inculcate") with government funds all perspectives
on a program subject (i.e., addiction recovery) except religious perspectives
raises precisely the free speech (and free exercise) issues discussed supra in Part
III. In this regard, it is significant that the court does not appear to have con-
cluded that any of the religious expression was outside the scope of the govern-
ment program. More to the point, free speech and free exercise issues do not
appear to have been before the DeStefano court.
These free speech and free exercise issues are particularly significant in
light of the fact that the holding is not compelled by Supreme Court precedent.
For instance, as discussed supra in Part IV.A, there is no support for the court's
conclusion that the staff's supervision of AA activities constituted "religious
indoctrination" for purposes of the Establishment Clause. Because the Court
has never identified any such activities in the context of a direct government aid
program, it is apparent that the DeStefano court merely assumed, without direct
support, that a broad construction of restricted religious expression was re-
quired. However, the court could have concluded, consistent with a narrow
construction, that the religious perspectives presented in the AA program did not
constitute "indoctrination" as that term is used for purposes of the Establishment
Clause because the AA program was directed toward the immediate objectives
of the program.
Likewise, the court's analysis reads too much into Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Mitchell. The court concluded that attribution of religious indoc-
trination occurs in every instance where direct funding is used for activities that
could be characterized as religious indoctrination.193 In fact, Justice O'Connor
merely held that actual diversion of funds to certain (unspecified) religious ac-
tivities under a formally neutral program may (but does not necessarily) violate
the Establishment Clause. In this regard, she noted that the logic of prior cases
such as Agostini and Bowen rested in part upon this proposition, but she did not
elaborate on the contours of the proposition. 194 Specifically, she did not identify
what types of activities would constitute religious indoctrination for purposes of
this rule, nor did she consider the circumstances under which private religious
expression in a religiously neutral aid program would be attributed to the gov-
191 Id. at 418 (quoting Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837 (O'Connor J., concurring)).
192 Id. at 419.
193 id. at 418.
194 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 840-41 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ernment. Instead, she concluded that resolution of these issues was "unneces-
sary to decide the instant case."'
195
Reading Justice O'Connor more narrowly, the court could have con-
cluded that use of funds to express religious perspectives on social skills devel-
opment under a religiously neutral program does not result in attribution. This
more narrow analysis would have afforded greater respect for the free speech
and free exercise rights of the funding recipients.
196
Essentially the same issues arise in the case of Freedom From Religion
Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum. 97 In that case, the district court held that the
direct, unrestricted government funding of a religious organization that provided
various social services from a religious perspective (including an AA program)
violated the Establishment Clause. 98 The court concluded that the organiza-
tion's activities constituted religious indoctrination because its staff members
"encourage participants to integrate spirituality into their recovery program."'' 99
Further, although the organization "may have the secular purposes of providing
drug treatment, education and job training, this does not mean that religion does
not permeate the programming.",200 Likewise, the court held that the religious
indoctrination is attributable to the government when the organization receives
unrestricted cash payments from the government without regard to how many
recipients enroll in the organization's program.20 The McCallum Establishment
Clause analysis closely follows the DeStefano analysis, and is therefore subject
to the same flaws as those discussed above.20 2
To summarize, the distinction between narrow and broad constructions
of religious expression restrictions reveals the unwarranted doctrinal positions
taken by the lower courts in the preceding cases. The courts assumed, without
support, that the restricted expression includes religious views on topics within
195 Id. at 838. The limits of the Court's analysis regarding the types of private religious expres-
sion upon which government funds may not be expended are discussed more fully in Part IV.A
supra.
196 Alternatively, the case could have been correctly decided on the ground that there were no
restrictions against exclusively religious activity outside the scope of the program.
197 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
198 Id. at 970-71, 978.
199 Id. at 969.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 970-71.
202 Compare id. at 966-78 with supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text. Essentially the
same analysis was also applied by the court in American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana v.
Foster, No. 02-1440, 2002 WL 1733651, at *4-*6 (E.D. La. July 24, 2002). The court's reliance
upon a broad construction is revealed by its injunction prohibiting the disbursement of funds "to
organizations or individuals that convey religious messages or otherwise advance religion in any
way in the course of any event supported in whole or in part by [government] funds." Id. at *7.
The court did not consider the free speech or free exercise implications of this injunction.
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the scope of the government programs. In addition, the courts assumed, without
support, that all religious expression of private religious organizations will be
attributed to the government when the organizations receive direct, unrestricted
20funding under a religiously neutral program. 03 The very real free speech and
free exercise issues raised by the religious expression restrictions do not permit
such unwarranted assumptions when alternative interpretations are available that
do not infringe on these rights.
D. A Narrow Construction Is Consistent with Rules Applicable to the
Religious Activities of Government Employees
A narrow construction of the religious expression restrictions is not only
consistent with the Supreme Court's cases involving government aid to private
organizations, but it is also consistent with the rules governing religious activi-
ties conducted by or at the direction (or under the supervision) of government
employees. A narrow construction prohibits the type of expressive activities the
Court has struck down and allows expressive activity generally permitted for
government employees.
The Court has on several occasions held that prayer expressed in public
schools by or under the direction of school officials violates the Establishment
Clause.2° Similarly, the Court struck down the practice of Bible reading by
students in public schools under the direction of school officials as a devotional
exercise. 20 5 The Court also prohibited a public school "release time" program
that allowed students to attend religious instructional classes in a religion of
their choice conducted on school premises during school hours, where students
not wishing to attend any such class were required to continue with their secular
studies during such time. 206 Finally, the Court has struck down state laws re-
quiring the posting of the Ten Commandments on the wall in each public school
203 See also Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Bugher, 249 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2001). In
Bugher, the Seventh Circuit held that grants to private religious schools under a religiously neutral
grant program violated the Establishment Clause because there were no restrictions on the use of
the grant funds. Id. at 614. Not only did the court rely on an overly broad reading of the law, but
it also incorrectly characterized the grants by failing to consider the terms under which they were
made. Specifically, the grants were available only for schools having telecommunications con-
tracts for video and data lines and were limited by the amount of such contracts. Id. at 609. There
is no relevant difference between a reimbursement grant under these conditions and a grant that
can only be used for telecommunications expenses.
204 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
205 Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
206 McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
20031
39
Lark: Religious Expression, Government Funds, and the First Amendment
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2003
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
classroom207 and requiring the teaching of "creation science" whenever evolu-
tion is taught in public schools.
208
The significance of these cases rests, in part, upon the fact that they
each involved religious activity conducted by or under the direction of govern-
ment employees for what the Court determined to be religious purposes. The
activities were not neutral with respect to religion nor did they, according to the
Court, further any credible objective unrelated to the advancement of religion.2°
It is also significant that all the cases involved religious activity in public ele-
mentary and secondary schools.21 °
Considered in context, the activities struck down in these cases should
properly be characterized as exclusively religious activities outside the scope of
any permissible government aid program. As such, they would be excluded
under a narrow construction of the religious expression restrictions. Accord-
ingly, these cases cannot be read for the proposition that any kind of prayer or.
religious instruction, regardless of the context in which, or purpose for which,
the activity is conducted, constitutes "sectarian worship, instruction or proselyti-
zation" under a religiously neutral government aid program. These cases simply
do not consider any context even close to such a program.
A narrow construction is also consistent with the rights of government
employees to engage in religious expression in their workplace. The Guidelines
on Religious Exercise and Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace, is-
sued by President Clinton in 1997, ensure that employees can engage in a wide
range of religious expression in many situations.211 For instance, section 1.A(2)
of the Guidelines states that "[e]mployees should be permitted to engage in reli-
gious expression with fellow employees, to the same extent that they may en-
gage in comparable nonreligious private expression. 212  Similarly, section
1.A(3) provides that "[e]mployees are permitted to engage in religious expres-
sion directed at fellow employees, and may even attempt to persuade fellow
employees of the correctness of their religious views, to the same extent as those
employees may engage in comparable speech not involving religion.2 13 Fur-
ther, section 1.A(4) specifies that "in their private time employees may discuss
religion with willing coworkers in public spaces to the same extent as they may
discuss other subjects, so long as the public would reasonably understand the
207 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
208 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
209 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 306-07 (2000).
210 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford, 533 U.S. 98, 115-19 (2001) (discussing Establish-
ment Clause cases considering the impressionability of schoolchildren).
211 See WORKPLACE GUIDELINES, supra note 5.
212 Id.
213 Id.
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religious expression to be that of the employees acting in their personal capaci-
ties. 214
Because the activities described above are not outside the scope of per-
missible government activity, they would not be excluded under a narrow con-
struction of the religious expression restrictions. However, a broad construction
strictly applied would likely prohibit any employees supported in part by gov-
ernment funding from engaging in any such activity since the activity could
arguably be characterized as "sectarian worship, instruction or proselytization."
Hence, a broad construction would deny employees of private grant recipients
the right to engage in religious expressive activities that are permitted for gov-
ernment employees.
E. A Narrow Construction Minimizes Government Influence on Private
Religious Choices
The limited reach of the cases discussed in this part can be explained by
the fact that the Establishment Clause, properly understood, acts primarily as a
constraint on the government, not on individuals acting in their private capaci-
215ties. As such, the Establishment Clause is intended to minimize government
influence on the religious choices of private individuals and associations. Ac-
cordingly, the Establishment Clause is not implicated in situations involving
truly private speech where the government has not sought to direct the speech
toward or away from religious viewpoints. In this context, the neutrality re-
flected in a narrow construction of the religious expression restrictions ensures
the proper separation between government and religion.216
In addition, neutrality with respect to viewpoints in government-funded
programs fosters the religious pluralism that lies at the heart of the First
Amendment.
As the domain of government increases in scope, some gov-
ernment involvement in religious activity becomes necessary if
religious exercise is to be possible at all. The device of
privatizing religion and secularizing government ceases to work
as a protection for religious liberty. More sophisticated, and
more contentious devices - based on self-conscious religious
pluralism even within the public realm - become essential.
That is why the old paradigm of "strict separation" under the
Establishment Clause has had to give way to ideas such as
"equal access," "neutral funding," and "accommodation." If it
had not, the expansion of government power, combined with
214 Id.
215 See generally Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Gov-
ernmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1988).
216 See generally Laycock, supra note 186.
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the expansion of government power, combined with the old in-
sistence on "strict separation," would have been a relentless en-
217gine of secularization.
One objection to a narrow construction is that it appears to render the
religious expression restrictions superfluous. Specifically, some argue that in
most government programs, such a construction does not limit the allowable
expression any more than the general program conditions designed to ensure
that program funds are used only to advance program objectives. But this is not
the case. At a minimum, the restrictions help protect against abuse by govern-
ment administrators and religious organizations with respect to an important
constitutional value. Although use of government funds for nonreligious activi-
ties outside the scope of a government program violates the program conditions,
use for similar religious activities may also violate the Establishment Clause.
For this reason, the Court in cases such as Mitchell and Bowen has looked to the
administration of government programs in evaluating potential Establishment
Clause violations. There is always a concern that government officials may
administer a religiously-neutral program in a way that effectively favors reli-
gious organizations. The religious expression restrictions, even narrowly con-
strued, provide a hedge against such impermissible administration.
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF A NARROW CONSTRUCTION
This article argues that religious expression restrictions in religiously
neutral government funding programs must be limited to exclusively religious
activities that are outside the scope of the program. This approach both respects
the free speech and free exercise rights of the participating organizations and
addresses the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine with respect to direct fund-
ing. To illustrate the practical implications of this approach, the Appendix con-
tains sample regulations related to the religious expression restrictions applica-
ble to the provision of SAMHSA programs. 218 The sample regulations address
two key questions for faith-based organizations participating in a SAMHSA
program:
1. How do the terms "sectarian worship, instruction and prose-
lytization" apply to various types of activities conducted by
faith-based organizations? In other words, how can a faith-
based organization (and government officials) determine
whether any particular expressive activity constitutes "sectarian
worship, instruction or proselytization"?
217 McConnell, supra note 77, at 1261.
218 See 42 U.S.C. § 300x-65(i) (2000) ("No funds provided through a grant or contract to a
religious organization to provide services under any substance abuse program ... shall be ex-
pended for sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization.").
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2. How can a faith-based organization demonstrate that it has
not expended any government funds on restricted activities? In
other words, what accounting and/or separation principles must
be followed with respect to the separate funding of permitted
and restricted activities?
The following sections discuss key aspects of the sample regulations as
well as additional issues that could be addressed.
A. Interpretive Principles
As an initial matter, the regulations clarify that the restrictions are based
on an objective assessment of the subject activities and that no consideration is
to be given to any internal motivations or underlying purposes of the religious
organization. Further, the regulations clarify that the restrictions only apply to
exclusively religious activities unrelated to the objectives of the government
program. In addition, the regulations clarify that employees of faith-based or-
ganizations have at least as much right to engage in religious expression (and in
many contexts, a greater right) as government employees in similar positions.
B. Standards for Separation of Funding
To the extent that a faith-based organization engages in religious ex-
pressive activity that is covered by the religious expression restrictions, the or-
ganization must be able to demonstrate that no government funds are expended
upon such activities. In Roemer, recipient institutions were required to segre-
gate state funds in a "special revenue account" and "to identify aided nonsectar-
ian expenditures separately in [their] budget[s] .,,2 19 The Court held that this was
sufficient for Establishment Clause purposes. Accordingly, with respect to
SAMHSA funds, faith-based organizations are required to "segregate govern-
ment funds provided under [a] substance abuse program into a separate ac-
count. ' 220 With respect to such account, such organizations "shall be subject to
the same regulations as other nongovernmental organizations to account in ac-
cord with generally accepted accounting principles for the use of such funds
provided under such program.
' 221
It is important to note that a faith-based organization receiving govern-
ment funds is not prohibited from engaging in "sectarian worship, instruction or
proselytization;" the organization merely may not expend government funds on
such activities. The charitable choice provisions suggest, appropriately, that the
standards governing the separate funding of impermissible religious expressive
219 Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 742 (1976).
220 42 U.S.C. § 300x-65(g)(2) (2000).
221 Id. at § 300x-65(g)(1).
20031
43
Lark: Religious Expression, Government Funds, and the First Amendment
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2003
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
activity should mirror the standards governing the separate funding of other
nonqualifying activities based on relevant, generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples. Regulatory guidance applying these standards specifically to the sepa-
rate funding of restricted religious expressive activity would greatly facilitate
the planning and implementation process for faith-based organizations.
C. Certifications
Some government programs require faith-based organizations to certify
that they will not use funds for certain religious activities.222 Such certification
requirements may have a substantial chilling effect on religious organizations.
To the extent that the terms "sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization"
are not adequately defined, a religious organization may have difficulty deter-
mining whether certain activities are restricted. The certification requirement
increases the effect of this ambiguity by placing the burden of resolving any
ambiguity in the meaning of the terms on the religious organization. In this
regard, the organization must consider the possibility that it might determine
that a particular activity does not constitute "sectarian worship, instruction or
proselytization," but that a court may subsequently disagree. In the face of po-
tential liability and ambiguity, a religious organization would have an incentive
to construe the restrictions much more broadly than Congress may have in-
tended or than the Establishment Clause may require.
Faith-based organizations should not be required to certify that their ac-
tivities do not constitute "sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization." As
an alternative, the religious provider could be required to certify that it will not
use government funds for activities outside the scope of the program.
D. Establishment Clause Limitations
To clarify their intended scope, the religious expression restrictions
should be accompanied by a provision stating that the restrictions on religious
expression shall only apply to the extent necessary to comply with Establish-
ment Clause requirements. In this way, the restrictions will not serve as an in-
dependent limitation on religious expression that is more burdensome than nec-
essary for Establishment Clause purposes.
222 The applicable provision in H.R. 7, 107th Congress (2001) reads as follows:
No funds provided through a grant or cooperative agreement to a religious or-
ganization to provide assistance under any program described in subsection
(c)(4) shall be expended for sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization.
If the religious organization offers such an activity, it shall be voluntary for
the individuals receiving services and offered separate from the program
funded under subsection (c)(4). A certificate shall be separately signed by re-
ligious organizations, and filed with the government agency that disburses the
funds, certifying that the organization is aware of and will comply with this
subsection.
[Vol. 105
44
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 105, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss2/4
RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION AND GOVERNMENT FUNDS
E. Active Participation in Religious Activities
The charitable choice provisions prohibit a religious organization from
discriminating against any individual who receives or applies for services under
a government funded program on the basis of "a refusal to actively participate in
a religious practice.' 23 Regulatory guidance is needed to clarify the extent to
which religious organizations may require such individuals to attend program-
related meetings where religious practices are conducted, provided that the indi-
viduals are not required (or otherwise pressured) to participate in such practices.
VI. SUMMARY
A broad construction of religious expression restrictions in government
funded programs assigns religious viewpoints (and the organizations that ex-
press such viewpoints) to the margins of society. Indeed, there will be no level
playing field in government-funded programs until it is recognized that the
Establishment Clause does not require the exclusion of religious perspectives
where such perspectives are funded without regard to their religious character.
Whether the government proactively adopts this position based on a good faith
reading of the Court's Establishment Clause cases (as this article argues it
should), or whether this position is forced upon the government by courts en-
forcing the Free Speech/Free Exercise rights of faith-based organizations, or
whether such organizations will continue to be marginalized in government pro-
grams, remains to be seen.
223 42 U.S.C. § 300x-65(f).
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APPENDIX
Sample Regulations Regarding SAMHSA Religious Expression Restrictions
"No funds provided through a grant or contract to a religious
organization to provide services under any substance abuse pro-
gram ... shall be expended for sectarian worship, instruction, or
proselytization." 42 U.S.C. § 300x-65(i).
1. Definition of Terms
As used in these regulations, and subject to section 2 below:
1.1 The term "sectarian" means religious or related to a particu-
lar doctrine regarding the ultimate meaning of life.
1.2 The term "sectarian worship" means ceremonies or practices
that render devotion or ascribe worth in accordance with a
sectarian belief or set of beliefs.
1.3 The term "sectarian instruction" means teaching or providing
information regarding a sectarian belief or set of beliefs.
1.4 The term "sectarian proselytization" means seeking to per-
suade a person to embrace a sectarian belief or set of beliefs.
2. Interpretive Principles
2.1 Objective Analysis. In determining whether an activity con-
stitutes sectarian worship, instruction or proselytization, no
inquiry shall be made into the subjective perspectives or mo-
tivations, or the religious doctrine, of the persons involved in
such activity. For example, the act of serving the poor and
needy shall not constitute sectarian worship merely because
the actor believes as a matter of religious doctrine that such
an act constitutes worship.
2.2 Exclusively Religious Activities. An activity shall constitute
sectarian, worship, instruction or proselytization for purposes
of this section only if it is outside the scope of the govern-
ment funded program. An activity shall be considered to be
outside the scope of a government funded program only if
the activity is not primarily directed toward any immediate
objective of the program or if a similar activity conducted
from a purely nonreligious perspective would not qualify for
funding under the program.
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2.3 Integrated Activities. An activity shall not constitute sectar-
ian, worship, instruction or proselytization for purposes of
this section merely because such activity includes religious
content or is conducted from a religious perspective, pro-
vided the religious content of such activity directly furthers
the objectives of the program and the activity as a whole
would qualify for funding if conducted from a purely nonre-
ligious perspective.
3. Separation Requirements
3.1 Discrete Activities. Organizations engaging in a discrete activ-
ity that constitutes sectarian worship, instruction or proselytiza-
tion as defined in sections 1 and 2 above must separate the
funding of such activity from the funding of activities con-
ducted with government funds. The required separation of fund-
ing may be accomplished by any means recognized by GAAP
for accounting for the use of separate funds in separate activi-
ties. See 42 U.S.C. § 300x-65(g)(1); OMB Circular A-102.
3.2 Mixed Activities. Organizations engaging in an activity that in-
cludes both qualifying activities and activities constituting sec-
tarian worship, instruction or proselytization as defined in sec-
tions 1 and 2 above must maintain separate accounts with re-
spect to the separate activities and all government funds must be
allocated to the account of the qualifying activities. The sepa-
rate accounts must comply with generally accepted accounting
principles related to the separate funding of separate activities.
3.3 Integrated Activities. An organization shall not be required to
maintain separate accounts or otherwise separately fund reli-
gious activities that qualify as Integrated Activities under sec-
tion 2 above.
3.4 Incidental Religious Activities. An organization need not ac-
count for the separate funding of an exclusively religious ac-
tivity as defined in section B above if the extent of such ac-
tivity is de minimis in nature such that a cost would not nor-
mally be allocated to such activity under GAAP.
4. Disclosure of Compliance with Separation Requirements; Disclaimer
The organization must display public notification that
SAMSHA funds may not be used for sectarian worship, in-
struction or proselytization as defined in the applicable regu-
lations and that the funding of any such activities must be
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separately accounted for pursuant to such regulations. The
notice shall also include the following: "Neither the U.S
Government, nor any state or local governmental body, en-
dorses any religious activity conducted by this organization."
5. Limitations on Restrictions
5.1 Private, Voluntary Activities. Nothing in these regulations
shall be construed to restrict any beneficiary from voluntarily
engaging in activities constituting sectarian worship, instruc-
tion or proselytization. Nothing in these regulations shall be
construed to restrict any individual involved in providing
services from engaging in activities constituting sectarian
worship, instruction or proselytization to the same extent that
such individuals may engage in other unfunded activities or
to the same extent that government employees may engage in
such activities.
The Guidelines on Religious Exercise and Religious Ex-
pression in the Federal Workplace, issued by President Clin-
ton in 1997, ensure that employees can engage in a wide
range of religious expression in many situations. For in-
stance, the Guidelines state that "[e]mployees should be
permitted to engage in religious expression with fellow em-
ployees, to the same extent that they may engage in compa-
rable nonreligious private expression." Section 1, Part (2).
Similarly, "[e]mployees are permitted to engage in religious
expression directed at fellow employees, and may even at-
tempt to persuade fellow employees of the correctness of
their religious views, to the same extent as those employees
may engage in comparable speech not involving religion."
Section 1, Part (3). Further, "in their private time employees
may discuss religion with willing coworkers in public spaces
to the same extent as they may discuss other subjects, so long
as the public would reasonably understand the religious ex-
pression to be that of the employees acting in their personal
capacities." Section 1, Part (4).
[Vol. 105
48
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 105, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss2/4
RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION AND GOVERNMENT FUNDS
5.2 Establishment Clause Limitation. The restrictions on reli-
gious expressive activity set forth in this section are imposed
solely for the purposes of complying with requirements of
the Establishment Clause as applied to the use of government
funds. The restrictions shall not be interpreted to restrict
more religious expression than that required by the Estab-
lishment Clause. Any restriction not required by the Estab-
lishment Clause shall not be valid (except for the require-
ments in section 4).
6. Examples
6.1 Types of Religious Expressive Activity
6.1.1 Sectarian Instruction
a. A religious social services organization that re-
ceives government funds for substance abuse
counseling provides weekly classes on the theol-
ogy of its religion. The classes do not address is-
sues related to substance abuse except to an inci-
dental degree. Because these classes are not di-
rected toward the treatment of substance abuse,
they constitute "sectarian instruction" under this
section.
b. In the course of its counseling program, employ-
ees of the religious organization instruct clients
that they can experience psychological healing
and develop the self-esteem and strength neces-
sary to overcome addiction by relying on the love
and forgiveness of God as taught by the organiza-
tion's religion. Because this instruction is di-
rected toward overcoming substance abuse, it
does not constitute "sectarian instruction" under
this section.
c. The organization conducts a weekly class on nu-
trition. The class does not have any identifiably
religious content, but the organization believes as
a matter of doctrine that the body is the temple of
God and that good nutritional practices are a reli-
gious duty. The class cannot be characterized as
"sectarian instruction" on the basis of this belief.
2003]
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6.1.2 Sectarian Worship
a. A religious social services organization that re-
ceives government funds for substance abuse
counseling conducts a weekly service open to all
employees, volunteers and clients. The service
consists of singing, reading and instruction based
on sacred texts, and the performance of sacra-
mental activities according to the tenets of the re-
ligion. The service only refers to substance
abuse issues incidentally (if at all). This service
constitutes "sectarian worship" under this sec-
tion.
b. During counseling sessions, employees of the re-
ligious organization pray with clients for
strength, peace, forgiveness and healing on issues
related to substance abuse. Such prayer does not
constitute "sectarian worship" under this section.
c. The religious organization believes as a matter of
doctrine that helping people overcome addiction
is an act of service to God and a form of worship.
The activities of the organization cannot on this
basis be characterized as "sectarian worship" un-
der this section.
6.1.3 Sectarian Proselytization
a. A religious social services organization that re-
ceives government funds for substance abuse
counseling conducts weekly meetings open to the
public at which participants are instructed in the
steps necessary to subscribe to the religion and
are encouraged to do so. There are only inciden-
tal references to substance abuse issues in these
meetings. Because these meetings are not di-
rected toward the treatment of substance abuse,
they constitute "sectarian proselytization" under
this section.
[Vol. 105
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b. During counseling sessions, employees of the re-
ligious organization discuss with clients how
subscribing to their religion can facilitate the
process of overcoming substance abuse. In addi-
tion, employees assist clients who so desire in the
process of subscribing to the religion. Such ac-
tivity does not constitute "sectarian proselytiza-
tion" under this section.
c. Volunteers of the religious organization spend
time helping clients with personal matters as part
of the process of overcoming substance abuse is-
sues. The volunteers do not necessarily discuss
anything related to religion during these times.
However, they believe that process may build the
kind of trusting relationship in which an opportu-
nity to discuss religious matters may arise. The
time spent by the volunteers with clients cannot
be characterized as "sectarian proselytization"
based on this belief.
6.2 Separation Requirements
6.2.1 Discrete Activities. The weekly services that consti-
tute "sectarian worship, instruction or proselytiza-
tion" described in subsections 6.1.1(a), 6.1.2(a), and
6.1.3(a) above would be characterized as discrete ac-
tivities and must be funded from nongovernmental
sources according to the rules set forth in section 3.1
above.
6.2.2 Mixed Activities. A religious organization conducts
weekly staff training sessions, half the time of which
is spent on matters related to the treatment of sub-
stance abuse. The other half of the time is spent en-
gaged in worship activities unrelated to the treatment
of substance abuse. The funding of these sessions
must be allocated to government and nongovernment
sources according to the rules set forth in section 3.2
above.
6.2.3 Incidental Activities. Employees and volunteers of a
religious organization occasionally engage in prayer
during work hours regarding personal matters, cur-
rent events, the spiritual well being of clients and
2003]
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other matters (many of which are unrelated to sub-
stance abuse). These prayer times, which are un-
planned and of short duration, are similar in scope to
discussions of sporting or other events that often oc-
cur among employees. Because they are de minimis
in nature, these activities do not need to be funded
separately.
6.3 Limitations
6.3.1 Activities of Beneficiaries. During a group session,
one client wishes to initiate a conversation on reli-
gious matters with another client. Neither client is
required to participate in the conversation and may
choose not to do so at any time. Such a conversation
is not prohibited under these regulations.
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